Risk adjustment in health insurance and its long-term effectiveness by Beck, K et al.
  1/21 
 
Risk Adjustment in Health Insurance and its Long-term Effectiveness
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Konstantin Beck 
a, b, 2 
 
Maria Trottmann 
a 
 
Peter Zweifel 
a 
 
 
 
 
a
) Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, Hottingerstrasse 10, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland 
b
) CSS Institute for Empirical Health Economics, Tribschenstrasse 21, CH-6002 Lucerne, Switzer-
land 
 
 
 
 
 
Revised Version, February 2010 
 
 
 
 
e-mail adresses:  
Konstantin Beck:  konstantin.beck@css.ch 
Maria Trottmann:  maria.trottmann@soi.uzh.ch 
Peter Zweifel:  pzweifel@soi.unizh.ch
                                                 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 7th conference of the European Risk Adjustment Network (RAN), 
March 2006 in Berlin, Germany. The authors thank the members of the RAN, especially Wynand van de Ven and Erik 
Schokkaert, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. 
2 Corresponding author: Konstantin Beck/ CSS Institute for Empirical Health Economics/ Tribschenstrasse 21/ CH-
6002 Lucerne/ Switzerland / telephone: ++41 58 277 11 11/ fax: ++41 58 277 15 16/ e-mail: konstantin.beck@css.ch/  
website: www.css-institute.ch  
  2/21 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Enthoven‟s proposal for regulated competition between social health insurers (Enthoven 1978) has 
been used as a blueprint for reform in several countries (see van de Ven et al. 2006). One example 
is Switzerland with its comprehensive mandatory coverage for all citizens, offered by some 80 
competing nonprofit health insurers. The new law of 1994 calls for semiannual open enrollment and 
community-rated premiums within the same fund. Premium reductions for adults within a given 
fund are only possible for contractual differences such as a higher deductible. However, with every 
adult paying the same premium – within a given fund for the same type of contract - but expected 
health care expenditure (HCE) varying widely, strong incentives for risk selection are created in the 
absence of an adequate risk adjustment scheme. Although risk selection is illegal, its prevalence in 
Swiss social health insurance has been reported repeatedly (Beck and Zweifel 1998, Beck et al. 
2003). As van de Ven and Ellis (2000, section 2.5) argue, risk selection produces no benefits to so-
ciety (unless a dynamic view is adopted, where the threat of being classified as an unfavorable risk 
in the future helps to reduce moral hazard).  
The objective of risk adjustment is to mitigate incentives for risk selection. To this end,  insurers 
with a below-average share of female and elderly consumers have to contribute to the risk adjust-
ment fund, while insurers with an above-average share receive a payment from the fund. So far, the 
different schemes have been judged mainly in terms of their ability to predict individual HCE one 
year ahead (Newhouse et al. 1989, van Barneveld et al. 2000, Holly et al. 2003).  
This criterion is subject to at least two criticisms. First, risk selection is not costless to insurers. As 
pointed out by van Barneveld et al. (2000) as well as Zweifel and Breuer (2006), this means that 
they will invest in this activity only if expected profits exceed the cost. However, the regression 
criterion of minimizing squared prediction error with regard to HCE fails to take cost considerations 
into account. In our model, we address the problem of costly risk selection activities by restricting 
attention to selection profits and losses exceeding a given annual threshold. Second, Zweifel and 
Breuer argue that insurers who want to stay in business must have an eye on present values rather 
than one-period profits.  
This paper, then, follows the lead of Shen and Ellis (2002) by estimating expected profits attainable 
from risk selection, given the information available to the insurer. It therefore only models the clas-
sification of risk types, neglecting the problem of how to attract or deter types. However, if profits 
are large enough, strategies to perform risk selection will most certainly be developed by crafty in-
surers.  
However, unlike Shen and Ellis (2002), the present analysis assesses the impact of risk adjustment 
if insurers‟ planning horizon exceeds one year. In an attempt to reflect longer planning horizons 
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(which agree with insurers‟ preference for long-run contracts and guaranteed renewability unless 
prevented by regulation (Pauly et al. 1998)), the period of observation for expected profits is ex-
tended to five years in the body of the paper. This permits to take into account the fact that a cur-
rently favorable risk may develop into an unfavorable one, switch to a competitor, or die. Converse-
ly, an unfavorable risk may recover to become a favorable one in the future. In the theory of statis-
tics, these effects are known as “regression towards the mean” (Welch 1985; Beck 2004). The em-
pirical relevance of the regression towards the mean effect is assessed by varying the planning hori-
zon from one to five years. This is possible thanks to a panel data set covering some 180,000 indi-
viduals over eight years. 
The reminder of this article is structured as follows. In section 2, a model of the insurer's decision to 
select risks is formulated, which subsequently permits to calculate the financial reward from this 
activity. After a description of the risk adjustment schemes and the database in section 3, the details 
of the empirical estimation are explained in section 4. Results are presented in section 5. They indi-
cate that even a crude adjustment in the risk adjustment formula to take future HCE into account 
serves to neutralize incentives for risk selection to a substantial extent also over a longer planning 
horizon. The final section 6 is devoted to a summary and conclusions.  
 
2 Modeling risk selection 
 
2.1 What risks to attract or deter?  
The objective of this section is to model a health insurer‟s decision to attract or deter certain risk 
types. This decision is assumed to reflect insurers‟ expected profits or losses ( ][ , jiE  ) pertaining to 
costumer (i), taking into account the risk adjustment formula (j) applied by the regulator. To esti-
mate this quantity, five elements must be considered; viz. (1) the expected fair community-rated 
premium ( ][ ,, jtiPE ), (2) expected health care expenditure ( ][ ,tiHCEE ), (3) the expected contribution 
to the risk adjustment scheme ( ][ ,, jtiRAE ), a positive quantity for favorable risks, a negative one for 
unfavorable ones, its value depending on the risk adjustment formula (j)
3
, and (4) the probability of 
an individual dying )( ,
death
tip  or (5) switching to a competitor )( ,
switch
tip . This all boils down to expres-
sion (1), with the interest rate r (set to 0.06 throughout this paper) used to discount future payments,  
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3 All formulas are constructed in a way to guarantee that the sum of contributions to risk adjustment  paid by low risks is 
exactly balanced out by the sum of subsidies paid out for high risks. 
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Loadings for administrative expenses are neglected, because they are part of ][ ,, jtiPE  and 
][ ,tiHCEE  but do not enter ][ ,, jtiRAE . Note that HCE does not depend on the type of risk adjust-
ment imposed, although insurers‟ incentives to combat moral hazard (by launching product innova-
tions) may well be weakened by risk adjustment (Zweifel 2007). The assumed planning horizon 
comprises the years 2000 (defined as “current”) to 2004. Insurers‟ actual planning horizons might 
be even longer; however, data availability dictates one of no more than five years. This should be 
sufficient to at least approximate expected long-term profits. Following the approach proposed by 
van Barneveld et al. (2000), only „sufficiently large“ profits or losses are assumed to cause risk se-
lection activities. Profits in principle are „sufficiently large“  if returns to risk selection exceed its 
total cost, which not only comprises the expenses for product development, marketing, and actual 
administration of the risk portfolio but also the loss of reputation if found out by the media or the 
regulator. Clearly, information to estimate this quantity is not publicly accessible. Therefore, it is 
simply assumed that expected profits from risk selection must exceed CHF 1,000  (= $800 at 2006 
exchange rates) per annum and individual in present value to trigger selection activities. In a sensi-
tivity analysis, results changed surprisingly little when the threshold was lowered to CHF 400 and 
increased to CHF 1,200 p.a. The impact of this ad hoc assumption is therefore limited.  
According to Table 1, all customers are divided into four mutually exclusive subsets. Group A con-
tains all individuals with expected profits in excess of CHF 1000 p.a., while B has those with ex-
pected profits up to CHF 1,000 p.a. Conversely, C contains all individuals with expected losses up 
to CHF 1,000 p.a. and D those with losses beyond CHF 1,000 p.a.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Therefore, A is the set of risks the insurer seeks to attract, D contains the risks it wants to deter, 
while B and C are the risks that do not call for any risk selection effort. It is important to note that 
risk selection does not describe a “young-and-healthy-people-only” strategy under all circums-
tances. As shown in section 5.2, risk adjustment can turn elderly and even chronically ill individuals 
into favorable risks. 
 
2.2 Profits due to risk selection  
In order to assess the effectiveness of risk adjustment, the insurer's profits are calculated under the 
assumption that it had successfully applied the selection strategy described by table 1. The ex-post 
or realized profits generated by individual i and associated with risk adjustment scheme j are speci-
fied as follows,  
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Here τt is a deflator and mi,t is the number of months individual i is enrolled during a given year. 
Since τt reflects the general development of HCE since 2000, real profits are defined in terms of the 
cost of health care. Transformation to real terms facilitates the comparison of ex-post profits with 
ex-ante expectations. The latter (see equation (1)) are calculated in real terms for simplicity since 
risk classification is not affected by general inflation. Considering first the strategy of deterring un-
favorable risks, the financial benefit attainable, Π, is defined as profits contributed by the remaining 
risk types (i.e. A, B, and C) relative to their total (deflated) premium revenue,  
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Note that while labels A, B, C denote those individuals the insurer expects to be preferred or neutral 
risks (according to Table 1), formula (3) calculates realized profits from A, B and C- type custom-
ers. The same is true for formula (4) below. Realized figures serve to simulate the future profits 
associated with the choice of a risk-deterring strategy in the year 2000.  
The other strategy, attracting good risks, has to be defined differently because it is inconceivable 
that the population insured consist of subset A only. Rather, let x > 1 be the factor by which the size 
of A is increased (for example by strategically promoting high-deductible plans known in social 
health insurance in the Netherlands or Switzerland to provoke self-selection by low risks). Then, 
realized financial benefit is given by 
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If, for example, an insurer is able to triple its share of preferred A-type customers, its realized prof-
its will increase by 
Ai
ji,2  relative to a premium volume that itself increases by the first term in 
the denominator, i.e. 
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The more effective the risk adjustment, the smaller are these profits. As Beck and Zweifel (1998) 
point out, however, risk selection is a risky business. Some customers who are expected to be prof-
itable will in effect turn out to be unfavorable risks, while some who are deemed unfavorable will in 
fact contribute to profits. As will be seen in section 5.3, this uncertainty increases when the risk 
adjustment formula is refined.  
 
3 Policy setting and data 
 
3.1 Risk adjustment schemes considered 
The profits of risk selection are assessed in four different scenarios. The RAi,t,j values appearing in 
equations (1) and (2) are calculated according to the four risk adjustment schemes. They are retros-
pective rather than prospective, as in current Swiss regulation.  
 
(0) No risk adjustment 
The first scenario is a benchmark with no risk adjustment scheme in place.  
 
(1) Demographic risk adjustment 
Current Swiss risk adjustment uses 28 age and gender groups (26-30, 31-35 …91+), as in table 4. 
While these age groups are purely arbitrary, they are established in the market. The possibility of 
optimizing them for risk adjustment will therefore not be considered here. Also, payments are cal-
culated regionally. To avoid small sample problems in the top age groups of small cantons, this de-
tail is neglected by treating Switzerland as one region. 
 
(2) Demographic risk adjustment augmented by prior hospitalization 
This formula is part of a reform passed by Swiss parliament in 2007. Retaining current age and 
gender groups, it includes a dummy variable indicating hospitalization during the previous year. 
Empirical evidence presented by Beck (1998) and Holly et al. (2003) shows HCE to be substantially 
higher for individuals with hospital stays
4
 during the previous year. However, insurers might have 
an incentive to encourage short-term hospitalizations with the mere aim of receiving payments from 
the risk adjustment scheme. Therefore, only inpatient stays of three or more days are considered to 
be a hospitalization. Note that it is not the cost of the inpatient stay itself that is taken into account 
but the increased predicted HCE during the year following the stay. Therefore any manipulation of 
this adjuster would pay off only if this extra HCE were to exceed the cost of the hospitalization it-
self, which is very unlikely in the case of long stays.  
                                                 
4 Inpatient stays related to maternity are excluded.  
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(3) Demographic risk adjustment augmented by prior hospitalization and PCGs 
The final alternative to be considered is to augment existing demographic risk adjustment by both 
the indicator for prior hospitalization and Pharmaceutical Cost Groups (PCGs). There are 13 PCGs 
which are similar to those developed by Lamers and Van Vliet (2003). They were adapted to Swiss 
data by a team at CSS (Beck et al. 2006, ch. 4.2).   
As with all patient classification systems, the issue of how to deal with patients belonging to more 
than one class has to be addressed. Here, the sorting algorithm used by Pope et al. (2000) is em-
ployed by first calculating mean HCE by PCG for the entire sample and assigning the PCG with the 
highest value rank one and excluding its members from further calculations. Next, mean HCE is 
recalculated for the reduced sample, assigning the PCG with the highest value rank two, and so on. 
Finally, patients with more than one condition are assigned to the PCG with the highest rank. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
The predictive power of the four risk adjustment formulas is shown in Table 3. The R
2 
 values are 
high, mainly for two reasons. First, Swiss health insurers only pay roughly one-half of inpatient 
HCE, in keeping with the Law of Health Insurance of 1994. One-half of the bill is funded by can-
tonal governments, who heavily subsidize public hospitals. Since very high HCE are almost always 
due to hospitalization, outliers do not fully show in the data, causing goodness of fit to increase. 
Second, the marked increase in R
2 
from variant (2) to variant (3) can be explained by the fact that 
little prediction is involved because the observations on PCGs pertain to the same year as those on 
HCE. Table 3 also shows that even with PCG information included, the regulator (who has to disre-
gard prior HCE for maintaining health insurers‟ incentive to control cost) cannot catch up with the 
health insurers, who dispose of a good deal of additional information which can be used to increase 
R
2
 to 0.48 (see section 4.2 for details).  
 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
3.2 The data  
The sample contains individual data from 182,529 adults (aged 26+) enrolled by CSS, the leading 
sickness fund of Switzerland, during the full year of 1999 and not enrolled in a Managed Care plan 
during the period of observation. For data quality reasons, only residents of the French and Italian 
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speaking parts of Switzerland are included.
5
 Individuals were observed from 1997 to 2004, with 
1997 to 1999 used for prediction. The insurer is assumed to undertake its risk selection effort once 
and for all at the beginning of the year 2000. The data from 2000 to 2004 serve for calculating the 
present value of profits it would have made by pursuing the respective strategy.  
 
4 Calculating the components of profits and losses  
 
To calculate expected profits from risk selection according to expression (1), all components such 
as expected premiums, expected HCE, expected payments into and from the risk adjustment fund as 
well as probabilities of death and of switching to a competitor need to be determined. This section is 
devoted to these issues.  
 
4.1 Expected premiums 
In a competitive market with entry and exit, total premium revenue equals total expected cost, the 
latter made up of expected HCE plus a loading. Since the admissible loading (of about five percent) 
is part of premium revenue as well as of cost, it does not affect individual contributions to profit and 
is therefore neglected
6
. Premiums must be community-rated for all adults within the same fund, 
region, and coverage option (e.g. deductible level). Premium reductions for high-deductible plans 
are possible, but - due to regulation - fall short of their risk-rated amounts. Contracts with high de-
ductibles are especially attractive to low risks, causing them to be an effective means for risk selec-
tion. Perfect risk adjustment would neutralize these incentives; however, given imperfect adjust-
ment formulas – and all formulas analyzed in this study are imperfect – differences in expected 
profits across deductible options remain. As a consequence, high-deductible plans cross-subsidize 
low-deductible plans. Therefore consumers choosing high-deductible plans become preferred risks 
to insurers.  
In order to be able to use observed values,  the insurer considered is assumed to have predicted total 
HCE of the benchmark year 2000 with perfect precision. Moreover, to simplify calculations, infla-
tion during the forecasting period 2001 –2004 is neglected. In fact, as long as inflation affects all 
components of eq. (1) in the same way (including payments to / from the risk adjustment scheme), 
                                                 
5 Due to different billing modalities, detailed information on drug expenditure is of good quality only in the French and 
Italian speaking parts of the country. Except for the Pharmaceutical Cost Group variant of risk adjustment, the analysis 
presented in sections 4 and 5 was repeated using a larger sample containing 250,000 insured from all parts of the country. 
Results were very similar to those presented here.  
6  A detailed analysis of administrative expenses might show different loadings for different risk groups; however, this goes 
beyond the scope of this study. 
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real profits do not change. Therefore, calculated premiums ][ ,, jtiPE  are constant over these four 
years.  
 
4.2 Expected health care expenditure  
Predicted individual HCE is derived from prior experience, covering the years 1997 – 1999. The 
year 1999 was complete, while missing entries from 1997 or 1998 were replaced by the average 
values pertaining to their demographic group. Insurers know past individual HCE for existing enrol-
lees. For  new enrollees, they can  predict HCE using information from questionnaires that have to 
be filled by new applicants for supplementary insurance (which is regulated differently, by the Law 
on Insurance Contracts). Only switchers having no more than compulsory coverage are not made to 
declare their health status. Still, sales personnel obtains an (often visual) impression of the custom-
er‟s health. The choice of deductible for the compulsory part also helps to predict HCE.  
Future individual HCE is estimated in three steps. The first is an OLS regression with HCE in 2000 
net of deductible and coinsurance as the dependent variable. Despite the fact that about 30 percent 
of individuals did not consume health care in excess of their deductible and the high skewness of 
positive HCE, untransformed OLS estimation is the preferred method of estimation. In a compari-
son of alternative models (e.g. a two-part logarithmic model with „smearing estimate‟ retransforma-
tion (Duan et al. 1984) and a GLM model with a log link and a gamma family (Manning and Mul-
lahy 2001)), untransformed OLS was found to have the smallest mean squared and smallest mean 
absolute prediction error. It performed particularly well at predicting very high HCE, which is of 
crucial importance to the insurer. Similar findings have been reported by e.g. Pauly and Herring 
(1999, p. 41), Holly et al. (2003), and Ellis (2008). The explanatory variables are age classes inte-
racted with gender, deductibles as of year 2000, HCE in 1997, 1998, and 1999 (the latter split up in 
its components, viz. physician‟s services, drugs dispensed by physicians, drugs dispensed by phar-
macies, inpatient care, home care, nursing home care, and other expenditure).  
The regression results appear in Table 4, with its first three columns showing age and gender ef-
fects, while its last two columns contain the estimates pertaining to the remaining regressors. Since 
the normality assumption does not hold in view of skewness, distribution-free Tchebycheff signific-
ance levels are also reported.  
 
 TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Except for the constant which is negative, all coefficients have the expected signs. For women, 
HCE attains a maximum (ceteris paribus) in the 26 – 30 age group (due to maternity), but rises con-
sistently between age groups 41 – 45 and 86 – 90. Beyond age 90 (men 85) age coefficients go 
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down. Otherwise, men display a consistent increase of HCE with age. In a second step, individual 
HCE in 2004 is predicted using the 1997 – 1999 values of explanatory variables (age as of 2004). 
Negative predicted values (occurring among about 5 percent of insured) are replaced by zeroes. The 
third step consists in interpolating between the predicted 2004 and the observed 1999 values, in 
accordance with eq. (5). This procedure can be justified by noting that observed HCE contains tran-
sitory components, while the predicted 2004 values are purged of them. By smoothing HCE values 
prior to 2004 as well, interpolation serves the accuracy of prediction. For the choice of the interpo-
lation formula, a natural assumption is that insurers increasingly discount the transitory component 
as time goes by. Using exponential decay, the formula reads 
 
(5)  1999,2004,19992004,, ][)5.0(][][ iititi HCEHCEEHCEEHCEE   ; for }2003,...,2001,2000{t  
 
It amounts to van Vliet‟s (1992) moving average variant (MA) of his implementation  of the  “re-
gression to the mean hypothesis” by Welch (1985). All three variants (a simple autoregressive (AR) 
model, an AR variance component model, and an ARMA model) were fitted to the residuals of a 
HCE regression using individual data of 33,987 Swiss insured from 1990 to 1997. The three speci-
fications yielded very similar AR coefficients, ranging between 0.491 and 0.521 (Beck, 2004, ch. 
5). These findings support the use of formula (5).  
 
 
4.3 Expected payments from / to the risk adjustment fund 
The ex-post calculation of the different risk adjustment formulas is straightforward. By way of con-
trast, modeling the insurer’s expectations ( ][ ,, jtiRAE  in expression (1)) raises a few issues. When 
applying the different risk adjustment schemes to future years (2001-2004), age is known while 
gender and existing chronic illness can be assumed to remain constant. Individuals who will devel-
op chronic conditions are aggregated with the low risks, assuming that they cannot be identified. By 
way of contrast, knowing that about 12 percent of enrollees had at least one hospital stay during the 
preceding year, the insurer associates by assumption the top 12 percent in terms of total HCE  with 
those that will have a hospital stay (relevant for risk adjustment schemes no. (2) and (3)).  
 
4.4 Probability of leaving the insurer 
As evidenced by eq. (1), two probabilities need to be distinguished here, the probability of death, 
(
death
hip , ) and the probability of switching to another insurer, (
switch
kip , ). Estimating (
death
hip , ) specifically 
for this population turned out to be impossible because of the small number of deceased in the sam-
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ple. Instead, life tables provided by the Federal Statistical Office were used, which are grouped by 
age and gender. However, high HCE have been found to be strongly related to death by e. g. Zwei-
fel et al. (2004). The probability of death is therefore certainly underrated for high-cost individuals, 
since they are more likely than others to drop out of the sample in the course of the forecasting pe-
riod. This results in an overestimate of expected HCE. 
To estimate the probability of an insured switching to a competitor ( switchkip , ), a logistic regression 
model is used (Beck 2004, ch. 9). This probability is calculated each year, applying the same, con-
stant coefficients (estimated by Beck (2004) on a different set of data). The model comprises age, 
years of CSS membership, number of supplementary insurance products, and premium relative to 
the market average as explanatory variables. Age has a negative effect, accounting for the decreased 
mobility of older individuals. Duration of membership also has a negative effect because loyal 
members tend to remain loyal. Insured with several supplementary insurance products have more 
difficulty switching because the open enrollment requirement holds only for the compulsory com-
ponent of coverage. Legally, it is possible to buy compulsory and supplementary coverage from 
different insurers, but consumers are afraid of insurers haggling over their obligation to pay, which 
easily results in delayed reimbursement.
7
  
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Risk adjustment and the distribution of expected individual profits 
The choice of the risk adjustment scheme has a strong impact on the distribution of predicted indi-
vidual profits and losses. As profits are zero in a competitive market,  
n
i ji
E
n 1
, ][
1
  is zero in all 
scenarios. Without risk adjustment (j=0), the distribution is heavily skewed to the right, and exhibit-
ing a marked tail of very sizeable losses (Figure 1, tail cut at -20,000). With a risk adjustment 
scheme including prior hospitalization and PCGs (j=3) the distribution of 

i,3  is almost symmetri-
cally centered at zero (Figure 2), with its median value equal to CHF 489, down from CHF 5,985 
with no risk adjustment. However, there is a heavy tail of very profitable consumers, who (in expec-
tation) seem to be overpaid by the risk adjustment scheme. 
 
FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE  
 
                                                 
7 Finally, a high CSS premium relative to the market average encourages consumers to switch. However, construction of this 
variable in the present context would have required modeling the premium development of competitors (which in turn 
would depend also on payments into and from the risk adjustment scheme). Therefore, this ratio is set equal to one to avoid 
this complication. 
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The objective of risk adjustment is to neutralize insurers‟ incentive for risk selection given that 
premiums are regulated not to reflect true risk. It therefore should affect the composition of the risk 
pool in terms of the subsets A through D distinguished in section 2 above. Indeed, variant (3) causes 
the share of risks in subgroup A (expected individual profit > CHF 1,000 p.a.) to drop from 56 per-
cent (no risk adjustment) to a minimum of 20 percent. Since the left tail is not thinned out complete-
ly (compare figures 1 and 2), the share of individuals in the unfavorable group D decreases only 
slightly from 21 to 18 percent. Table 5 exhibits the full set of estimates. However, as will be shown 
in the next section, risk adjustment causes the composition of these groups to change completely.  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.2 Effect of risk adjustment on the characteristics of subgroups  
Risk adjustment may have an important effect on the characteristics of the subgroups making up the 
risk pool. This effect seems to have been largely neglected in the literature. However, the political 
acceptance of a risk adjustment scheme strongly depends on its distributional impacts. Since in-
comes are not known, the analysis of this section is limited to age and two indicators of health sta-
tus, viz. HCE prior to risk adjustment and membership in one or more PCG.  
Without risk adjustment (0), profitable members (A) are pretty much the usual suspects, viz. young-
er than average, low net HCE and rare PCG membership, indicating absence of chronic illness (see 
Table 6). Unsurprisingly, demographic risk adjustment (1) changes this picture strongly in terms of 
age, causing mean age in subgroup A to increase from 46 to 62 years. Conversely, average age 
drops by as much as 20 years in subgroups B and C while it still decreases by 11 years in subgroup 
D. At the same time, HCE (net of cost sharing) more than doubles in subgroup A, while member-
ship in at least one PCG more than triples, reaching 11 percent (not far below the overall share of 15 
percent). This indicates that even mere demographic risk adjustment can turn some chronically ill 
individuals into profitable customers. However, the D subgroup continues to have by far the highest 
average HCE and share of PCG members.  
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
When prior hospitalization is included in the type (2) risk adjustment scheme, characteristics of the 
subgroups change again. Average age in the A group even increases to 70, exceeding the value im-
plied by the demographic formula (1). Because morbidity is higher among the elderly, they are 
more likely to get a morbidity-related subsidy, making them attractive risks to the insurer. The 
change in the composition with regard to health status is even more striking. Average net HCE in 
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the subgroup A now is CHF 328, exceeding the overall mean of CHF 291 per month. Likewise, A 
now contains 20 percent individuals who are in some PCG (overall mean, 15 percent). Put the other 
way round, many ill people may now contribute to expected profit even if their expected HCE is 
above average, while the very healthy are transformed into average risks because they are loaded 
with payments to the risk adjustment scheme.  
When PCGs are also included into the scheme (type 3), average age remains roughly the same in all 
subgroups. However, average net HCE in the A group increases, while those of the unfavorable D 
group decrease once more, to CHF 631 per month (which is still more than twice the overall mean 
of CHF 291). The most amazing change, however, is in PCG membership. The A subgroup now 
consists of 47 percent chronically ill. 
In sum, this analysis offers important insights into the workings of risk adjustment schemes (2) and 
(3). By collecting transfers from healthy people, they transform them (on average) from very favor-
able into medium risks from the insurer‟s point of view. The high risks on the other hand come with 
a subsidy, making some of them very profitable. These profits indicate an overpayment by the risk 
adjustment scheme, which can be explained as follows. While the subsidy equalizes average ex-
pected contributions across risk groups, a majority of individuals has HCE below group average 
because the distribution of HCE is skewed to the right even within a risk group, with a long tail to-
wards high values.  
Before turning to the financial benefits attainable by risk selection, two points should be mentioned. 
First, a morbidity-based risk adjustment makes it more difficult to recognize risks. With no or only 
demographic risk adjustment, it is sufficient for insurers to gather information about prior utiliza-
tion and personal well being, whereas with schemes of type (3), they will have to establish precisely 
those chronic conditions that yield the highest contributions – a far more complex task. The second 
point concerns risk selection through quality of services covered. As pointed out by e.g. Newhouse 
(1982) and van de Ven and Ellis (2000), insurers may try to stave off unfavorable risks by e. g. in-
corporating lower quality care for the chronically ill (always on the premise of community rating 
combined with imperfect risk adjustment). This form of selection hurts some of the weakest. More-
over, it is difficult to contain because service quality cannot easily be regulated (Marcheand et al. 
2004). The authors cited agree in their expectation that morbidity-related risk adjustment of the 
types (2) and (3) are a suitable tool to prevent this type of selection. The present analysis supports 
this notion by showing that scheme (3) causes the most favorable risk group to contain a large num-
ber of chronically ill individuals, who are eschewed by insurers who offer them benefits of lower 
quality. Conversely, insurers with a small market share (and therefore little influence on mean 
HCE) may benefit by attracting the chronically ill through special programs. In the Netherlands, 
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where morbidity indicators are included in the risk adjustment scheme, an insurer in fact developed 
a disease management program for diabetes patients (van de Ven et al. 2006).  
 
5.3. Estimating the financial incentive for risk selection 
In this section, we derive an estimate of the financial gains from risk selection by calculating ex- 
post profits associated with the strategies described. According to equation (2), these profits are a 
function of the risk adjustment schemes (0) to (3). The financial advantage due to risk selection is 
expressed as the ability to offer a lower premium, which almost certainly leads to a favorable mar-
ket position in view of strong price competition. From the moment an insured in our sample dies or 
switches to another insurer, her cash flow drops to zero, as in real life. All figures are in prices of 
2000.  
First, the strategy of deterring expectedly unfavorable risks (D) is evaluated. An insurer capable of 
getting rid of all expectedly unfavorable risks (D) could reduce its average premium level by as 
much as 46 percent on expectation when there is no risk adjustment at all (see Table 7). Introducing 
age and gender as risk adjusters already serves to reduce the potential for premium reductions by 
one third. The most elaborate variant (3) achieves a reduction of two thirds, to 16 percent.  
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
The other strategy is to attract risks that are expected to be favorable (A). Let x denote the factor by 
which the number of A – rated costumers is increased, the number of risks in all other subgroups 
held constant. If x goes to infinity, the risk portfolio consists to over 99 percent of A-rated custom-
ers. Because many Swiss insurers are rather small, 4  ≤  x  ≤  6 are considered realistic values. 
Without risk adjustment, this strategy on expectation permits a lowering of the premium level by 48 
percent (x = 6, in table 8). Demographic adjustment (1) reduces this figure to 38 percent. However, 
it takes schemes (2) and (3) involving prior hospitalization and PCGs to largely reduce the financial 
gains associated with “chasing the good risks”. 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
The entries of tables 7 and 8 indicate that even in the long run, “regression to the mean” does not 
equalize risk profiles. Without risk adjustment, both deterring unfavorable and attracting favorable 
risks are highly profitable strategies. However, adding the crude morbidity indicator, prior hospita-
lization, works surprisingly well to neutralize these gains. A possible explanation is the fact that 
hospitalization is a good proxy for HCE in earlier years, which are used for prediction by the insur-
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ers.
8
 It is well known that risk adjustment schemes work best if they predict cost to the same degree 
as insurers themselves.  
The contribution of PCGs on the other hand is somewhat disappointing, raising doubts whether the 
administrative expense for establishing them is worthwhile. However, table 6 shows that the risk 
adjustment formula (3) including PCGs excels in directing subsidies specifically to individuals with 
consistently high HCE. The incentive to skimp on the quality of care for the chronically ill is cer-
tainly the weakest with this formula. 
As shown in table 9, misclassification is likely to occur, its extent clearly depending on the risk ad-
justment scheme implemented. For example, the fraction of individuals rated A who ex post gener-
ated losses is 7 percent without risk adjustment but 25 percent with risk adjustment (3). In other 
words, with risk adjustment (3) in place, as many as one-fourth of all seemingly very attractive cus-
tomers were misclassified. For the D-rated customers, the frequency of misclassification is quite 
high for all risk adjustment schemes. This likely reflects the fact that – due to the lack of diagnostic 
information – predictions were based on total prior cost, failing to distinguish between acute and 
chronic illnesses. Again, false classifications occurred more frequently with a morbidity-based risk 
adjustment scheme in place. These results confirm our previous claim (section 5.2) that a morbidity-
based risk adjustment scheme makes it more difficult to distinguish between profitable and unpro-
fitable risks. In the absence of risk adjustment, unprofitable risks are simply all customers with 
above - average HCE, for example all chronically ill individuals. By subsidizing some conditions 
leading to high HCE, morbidity-based risk adjustment changes this, turning some of the high risks 
into to very profitable customers  (see table 6). In sum, morbidity-based risk adjustment requires a 
much more careful screening of individual risk profiles and health conditions by insurers seeking to  
pick profitable risk.  
 
TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.4. Variation of the planning horizon 
As stated in the Introduction, it is reasonable to assume that insurers plan over a period of several 
years. In order to assess the importance of this consideration, equations (1) to (4) were recalculated 
assuming planning horizons of four, three, two, and one year
9
. The calculation of these models is 
straightforward. In expressions (1) to (4), the summation stops at the pertinent year prior to 2004. 
                                                 
8 We thank Erik Schokkaert for pointing this out.  
9 We thank Mathias Kifmann, our discussant at the 19th annual meeting of the Health Economics Working Party within the 
Verein für Socialpolitik, and an anonymous referee for pointing this out.  
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To estimate expected HCE, formula (5) is applied replacing ][ 2004,iHCEE  by  ][ ,tiHCEE , with 
}2003,...,2001,2000{t .  
With a shorter planning horizon, a considerably higher share of individuals were classified as very 
profitable A-types (see table 10). For example, with a one-year planning horizon and risk adjust-
ment (3), 40 percent of customers would have been classified as A as opposed to 20 percent with a 
five-year planning horizon. This is likely due to the 'regression-to-the-mean' specification of the 
forecasting model. For instance, let an elderly lady have small observed HCE in 1999. Then, her 
forecast HCE for 2000 would be quite low as well according to equation (5). Over the years, how-
ever, predicted values approach the high (conditional) mean HCE of a person of her type. The other 
components of equation (1) being largely independent of the planning horizon, her rating might 
well drop from A in the one-year analysis to a B or C in the longer term.  
 
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
At the other end, however, the number of D-rated customers does not vary much with the planning 
horizon (see table 10). In fact, those who had high HCE in 1999 are mostly predicted to have high 
HCE in all subsequent years. This is especially true for those with high drug or long term care ex-
penditure, which point to chronic illness  (see table 4). Indeed, the entries of table 4 suggest the ex-
istence of a basically healthy type (with a low autoregressive element in HCE) and a chronic type 
(with a high element). This difference has implications for the risk of misclassification as a function 
of the planning horizon (see table 11).  
 
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
Considering A-rated customers first, their low autoregressive element in HCE causes predictability 
to decrease with length of planning horizon in principle [see rows (1) through (3)]. The countervail-
ing effect is regression to the conditional mean, which may make for more accuracy of prediction if 
the insurer selects risk based on observable characteristics unfettered by risk adjustment [see row 
(0)]. Turning to D-rated individuals, their high HCE is the consequence of a whole host of causes, 
resulting in a low degree of predictability and hence high frequency of misclassification. However, 
this group comprises an important share of chronically ill with their marked element of autoregres-
sion in HCE. This may explain why the risk of misclassification, while high compared to A-rated 
customers, decreases with length of the time horizon. 
 
TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE 
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Finally, table 12 displays the profits associated with risk selection as function of the planning hori-
zon. Starting with the strategy of attracting A-rated risks, the gains tend to increase, which accords 
with the finding that the frequency of misclassification decreases in the absence of risk adjustment 
[row (0) of tables 11 and 12]. By way of contrast, refinements of the risk adjustment formula cause 
gains not only to be lower but to decrease with the planning horizon [rows (1) to (3), again in keep-
ing with table 11]. In the case of D-rated customers, gains have a similar pattern [row (0) of table 
12], likely reflecting the tendency for predictability of HCE to improve [row (0) of table 11]. Again, 
these gains are reduced strongly by refinements of the risk adjustment formula.  
 
Reading table 12 vertically column by column, one sees that the gains from attracting A-rated or 
deterring D-rated customers can be reduced by at least one-half by the more refined risk adjustment 
formulas (2) and (3). Therefore, the relative effectiveness of the risk adjustment formulas neither 
hinges on the insurer's choice of planning horizon nor on the length of its planning horizon. 
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6. Conclusions  
There is a broad consensus that given managed competition with community-rated premiums, risk 
adjustment becomes a necessary regulation of health insurance markets. However, while a purely 
demographic risk adjustment formula has been recognized as being insufficient, its precise specifi-
cation has remained controversial. Most of the empirical literature describes and tests for the rela-
tionship between a set of morbidity indicators and HCE of one year. This short time horizon is in 
accordance with the fact that managed competition usually allows for annual open enrollment. 
However, insurers have a strong interest in long-term customers in view of considerable acquisition 
cost. Moreover, consumers likely would think twice before signing up with an insurer whose plan-
ning horizon is as short as one year. Given a longer-term perspective, insurers‟ strategies are influ-
enced by two empirical facts, viz. decreasing precision of forecasts and regression to the (condition-
al) mean. The first fact causes the risk of misclassification to increase with a longer planning hori-
zon. However, to the extent that the regression is to the conditional rather than the grand mean of 
HCE, the second fact may serve to increase the payoffs to risk selection when the planning horizon 
is extended.  
In this research, the effectiveness of risk adjustment schemes is assessed in the light of these con-
siderations. Purely demographic risk adjustment already increases the likelihood of misclassifica-
tion but does not sufficiently neutralize the longer-term, systematic differences in HCE to decisively 
mitigate the incentives for risk selection. For this, it takes a more refined formula that includes prior 
hospitalization and possibly Pharmaceutical Cost Groups (PCGs) as risk adjusters.  
Gains from risk selection are estimated based on predicted HCE net of copayments, premiums, and 
risk adjustment payments, discounted to present value and weighted by the probabilities of death 
and of switching to a competitor to obtain expected values. These calculations are performed for 
four different risk adjustment schemes, viz. (0) no risk adjustment, (1) demographic risk adjust-
ment, (2) demographic risk adjustment, with prior hospitalization added as a simple morbidity indi-
cator, and (3) PCGs complementing scheme (2). 
For a sample of some 180,000 Swiss individuals, expected net present values conditioned on the 
risk adjustment scheme were calculated. However, these values must exceed the variable cost asso-
ciated with risk selection effort in order to trigger action on the part of the insurer. Since this cost is 
unknown, an arbitrary but not unrealistic value of +/- CHF 1,000 p. a. ($ 800 as of 2007) serves as a 
threshold. Thus, the insurer is assumed to be indifferent with regard to risks whose contributions to 
expected profit fall within this interval.  
The risk adjustment schemes distinguished modify incentives for risk selection according to expec-
tations. The better they reflect morbidity, the smaller the share of the insured population that consti-
tutes favorable and unfavorable risks, respectively. Adjustment using only age and sex (type 1) 
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causes the share of favorable risks to drop from 56 to 40 percent, the share of unfavorable ones, 
from 21 to 18 percent. With schemes of type (2) and (3), the figures for the favorable risks drop to 
26 and 20, and for the unfavorable risks, to 17 and 18 percent, respectively. It also should be noted 
that the characteristics of the subgroups change dramatically with type of risk adjustment. Average 
age of favorable customers increases from 46 (type 0) to 71 years (type 3), while the share of those 
belonging to one or more PCGs (in indicator of chronic illness) increases from 3 to 47 percent.  
The success of risk selection efforts is reflected by the insurer‟s ability to lower premiums and 
hence gain market share. In the absence of risk adjustment, deterring all unprofitable risks is esti-
mated to result in a 46 percent premium reduction over five years. This longer-term competitive 
advantage is reduced to 16 percent under type (3) risk adjustment, which takes into account both 
prior hospitalization and membership in a PCG. Interestingly, this figure is in the same range as the 
premium reductions that may be offered for participation in a managed care alternative, which con-
stitutes a product innovation. Thus, it may be argued that type (3) risk adjustment is effective 
enough to redirect insurers‟ efforts from risk selection to product innovation. 
In addition, the risk of misclassification is a mere 7 percent for an insurer “chasing the good risks” 
as long as there is no risk adjustment but increases to 25 percent under scheme (3). Refined risk 
adjustment therefore becomes even more effective than indicated by the expected contribution to 
profit because it exposes insurers to increased uncertainty.  
In conclusion, this research suggests that risk adjustment can be designed in a way as to be effective 
enough in the longer term to redirect insurers‟ efforts away from risk selection in favor of product 
innovation while using easily available information such as prior hospitalization and membership in 
pharmaceutical cost groups. 
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Table 1: Assumed risk selection strategies, 1 CHF ≈  0.8 $ 
Risk type Characterization Strategy  
A Expected profit  
> 1000 CHF p. a. 
Attract 
B Expected profit 
≤ 1000 CHF p. a. 
Passive 
 
C Expected loss 
≤ 1000 CHF p. a. 
Passive 
 
D Expected loss  
> 1000 CHF p. a. 
Deter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Ranking of Pharmaceutical Cost Groups in terms of HCE 
Rank PCG Population share, 
in percent 
Average excess HCE,  
in CHF  per month  
1 Renal disease, ESRD 0.06 3.484  
2 HIV / AIDS 0.11 1.529 
3 Transplantations 0.15 1.291 
4 Malignancies 0.13 970  
5 Diabetes insulin-dep. 0.75 558  
6 Morbus Parkinson 0.38 440 
7 Epilepsy 0.89 280 
8 Respiratory illness & Asthma 2.16 248 
9 Morbus Crohn, Colitis ulcerosa 0.23 215 
10 Diabetes non insulin-dep. 2.40 180 
11 Rheumatologic conditions 2.85 165 
12 Acid peptic disease 0.59 142 
13 Cardiac disease 3.96 114 
0 None 85.33 - 
1 CHF ≈ 0.8 $ 
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Table 3: The four risk adjustment formulas compared 
Formula No. 
 
R
2
 
Year: 2000 
(0) None 0.00 
(1) Age, gender 0.11 
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization  0.21 
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 0.30 
Benchmark: 
Insurer’s own model 0.48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Individual HCE net of deductible and coinsurance, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
R
2 
= 0.481, Radj
2 = 0.481, F = 3750.2 (df=40) **, n  =  182’529,  
* p ≤ 0.05 , **p ≤ 0.01, ° Tchebycheff-significance level 10%  
 female male constant -354 **° 
26 - 30 492 **° reference cat. HCE 97     0.109 **° 
31 - 35 386 **° 28  HCE 98     0.080**° 
36 - 40 229 * 102 physician services 99                     0.540 **° 
41 - 45 181 * 122 drugs doctors 99 0.947 **° 
46 - 50 227 * 229 * drugs pharmacies 99 0.977 **° 
51 - 55 321 **° 275 ** inpatient care 99              0.347 **° 
56 - 60 310 **° 424 **° home care 99              0.936 **° 
61 - 65 472 **° 592 **° nursing home care 99              0.626 **° 
66 - 70 643 **° 1042 **° other HCE 99 0.626 **° 
71 - 75 1108 **° 1307 **° deductible 230 589 **° 
76 - 80 1602 **° 1725 **° deductible 400 297 **° 
81 - 85 2156 **° 2072 **° deductible 600 86 
86 - 90 2886 **° 2666 **° deductible 1200 79     
91+ 2580 **° 2267 **° deductible 1500 reference cat. 
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Table 5: Effect of risk adjustment on the size of the four subgroups A – D 
 Calculated shares in percent 
Risk adjustment A  B C  D  
(0) None 56 14 9 21 
(1) Age, gender 40 27 14 18 
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization  26 34 23 17 
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 20 35 27 18 
With A : ]E[π ji, > 1.000;  B: 0 < ]E[π ji,  < 1.000;  C:  0  > ]E[π ji,  > - 1.000;  D: ]E[π ji, < -1.000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Effect of risk adjustment (RA) on composition of subgroups 
Risk Adjustment Mean age in category,  
2000                 
Overall mean: 54 
Mean net HCE per month, 
2000 (CHF, prior to RA) 
Overall mean: 291 
Share of individuals in 
≥ 1 PCG, 2000 (percent) 
Overall mean: 15 
  A B C D A B C D A B C D 
(0) None 46 59 64 67 77 211 320 910 3 16 27 40 
(1) Age, gender 62 44 44 56 175 130 197 856 11 8 14 33 
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization  70 49 45 51 328 138 176 713 20 8 11 26 
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, 
PCG 
71 51 46 51 441 132 159 631 47 7 4 10 
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Table 7: Reduction of average premium thanks to deterring D-rated risks, in percent 
Risk adjustment Possible premium reduction 
(0) None 46 
(1) Age, gender 32 
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization  19 
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Financial advantage of attracting A-rated risks, in percent 
Risk adjustment x = 2 x = 4 x = 6 x = ∞ 
(0) None 23 41 48 66 
(1) Age, gender 17 32 38 57 
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization  7 15 19 31 
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 6 14 18 34 
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Table 9: Frequency of misclassification 
Risk adjustment formula No. Percentage of A-rated custom-
ers who ex post turn out to 
generate losses  
Percentage of D-rated cus-
tomers who ex post turn out 
to generate gains 
(0) None 7 24 
(1) Age, gender 15 28 
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization  23 35 
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 25 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10: Size of subgroups A and D with different planning horizons 
Risk adjustment formula No. Percentage A-rated Percentage D-rated 
1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year  3 years  5 years 
(0) None 70 68 56 18 18 21 
(1) Age, gender 52 49 40 19 19 18 
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization 44 39 26 18 18 17 
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 40 34 20 18 18 18 
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Table 11: Frequency of misclassification, different planning horizons 
 Percentage of A-rated customers 
who ex post turn out to generate 
losses 
Percentage of D-rated customers 
who ex post turn out to generate 
gains 
Risk adjustment formula No. 1 year 3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years 
(0) None 10 11 7 33 31 24 
(1) Age, gender 10 15 15 33 31 28 
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization 13 21 23 43 40 35 
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 15 21 25 45 41 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12: Premium reductions thanks to risk selection, different planning horizons (percent of average premium) 
 Gains from attracting A,  x= 4  Gains from deterring D  
Risk adjustment formula No. 1 year  3 years 5 years 1 year 3 years 5 years 
(0) None 37 35 41 45 40 46 
(1) Age, gender 35 31 32 38 33 32 
(2) Age, gender, prior hospitalization 18 17 15 19 19 19 
(3) Age, gender, prior hospitalization, PCG 18 17 14 17 17 16 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Expected individual profits without risk adjustment (0)
-20,000 20,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
0
Expected individual profits, E[πi,j]
N
um
ber of insured
Mean: 0, Std. deviation: 20,018
1. - 3.  quartile: -2,095 / 5,985 / 9,900
Interquartile range: 11,995
E[πi,j] < -20,000: 15,029 individuals
12,000- 12,000
4,000- 4,000
Mean: 0, Std. deviation: 14,536
1. - 3. quartile: -2,798 / 489 / 3,543
Interquartile range: 6,341
E[πi,j] < -20,000: 4,767 individuals
E[πi,j] >  20,000: 7,019 individuals
-20,000
-12,000
- 4,000 4,000
12,000
20,000
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
0
Expected individual profits, E[πi,j]
N
um
ber of insured
Figure 2: Expected individual profits with risk adjustment (3)
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